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1962] CASE COMMENTS 107
JURISDICTIONAL EXPANSION IN COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION
Arbitration is being used to settle an ever increasing number of
commercial and industrial disputes, with New York the acknowledged
leader in the field. New York was the first state to adopt a statute, in
1920, making "submission agreements"' and "future agreements" 2 to
arbitrate judicially enforceable.-" The New York act was the model
for the federal act, and for the American Arbitration Association draft
act which, in turn, has been used as a guide in drafting arbitration
statutes by many other states.4 For these reasons, and because New
ver) likely that damages to elderly plaintiffs could go unrectified. Moreover, adult
children will bear the hardship of caring for the injured parent. Query whether
this is pecuniary loss.
'Submission agreements to arbitrate are agreements to submit existing disputes
to arbitration. At common law both "submission agreements" and "future agree-
ments" to arbitrate were revocable. Discussions of the historical background of
commercial arbitration and of the origins of the common law rule are found in
Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 31 Yale
L.J. 147 (1921); Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration,
8 3 U. Pa. L. Rev. 132 (1934); 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1433 ('95'). The present ma-
jority rule in the United States is that only submission agreements are binding and
irrevocable. See 18 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 92 n.4 (1961), where statutes from 29 states
are cited. See 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1441 (1951) for a discussion of the general char-
acter of arbitration statutes.
2 Future agreements to arbitrate are agreements to arbitrate any disputes which
might arise out of the contract. 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1433 (1951); 6 Williston,
Contracts § 1919 (rev. ed. 1938).
3N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1448 (Clevenger 1961). "[T]wo or more persons may
submit to the arbitration of one or more arbitrators any controversy existing be-
tween them at the time of the submission... or they may contract to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them and such submission or
contract shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist
in law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
Prior to the adoption of this statute New York had held "future agreements"
to be invalid and revocable. Meacham v. Jamestown F. 8: C.R.R., 211 N.Y. 346,
io5 N.E. 653 (1914); People ex rel. Union Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Nash
iii N.Y. 310 (1888); Delaware & Hudson Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 50
N.Y. 250 (1872); Wood v. Lafayette, 46 N.Y. 484 (1871).
"The following statutes have been patterned after the New York statute, and
provide for enforcement of both "submission agreements" and "future agreements"
to arbitrate: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-1509-11 (1956); Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1280-93;
Colo. Rev. Civ. Proc. § to9 a-g; Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 52-408 (1958); District of
Columbia: 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958); Hawaii Rev. Laws §§ 188-1-15 (1955); La. Rev.
Stat. § 9:4201 (1950); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 251 , § 14 (1956); Mich. Comp. Laws §
645.1 (1948); N.H. Rev. Laws ch. 415 § 1 (1952); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2T.24-1 (1952);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.01 (Baldwin 196o); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 33.220; Pa. Stat.
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York courts have been interpreting its statute for the longest period
of time, the New York law is peculiarly indicative of trends in the
field.
In light of the recent New York case of Exercycle Corp. v. Marat-
ta,' there is indication that the scope of commercial arbitration is still
expanding. In Exercycle, the plaintiff, James Maratta, entered into
an employment agreement with Exercycle Corporation in which Exer-
cycle agreed to employ Maratta as sales supervisor until he volun-
tarily left or died, but retained the right to terminate the. agreement
if sales fell below a specified level. Maratta, in turn, promised to de-
vote his "best efforts and full time" to the company's sales activities.
The agreement contained a broad arbitration clause providing that
"any dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall
be settled by arbitration." In 1959, four years after the agreement
was made, differences arose between Maratta and the company. Ex-
ercycle Corporation then moved in court for a stay of arbitration
claiming that the agreement was "void and unenforceable" because
it lacked mutuality in that it obligated Exercycle to employ Maratta
for life while permitting Maratta to terminate the agreement at will.
The Supreme Court, Special Term, denied Exercycle's motion for
a stay of arbitration. This decision was affirmed by the Appellate Divis-
ion. The Court of Appeals also affirmed stating:
"Once it can be ascertained that the parties broadly agreed
to arbitrate a dispute arising out of or in connection with the
agreement, it is for the arbitrators to decide what the agree-
ment means and to enforce it according to the rules of law
which they deem appropriate in the circumstances."0'
The court declined to pass on the issue of whether there was a
valid and enforceable contract in existence between Maratta and
Exercycle, and held that it was error for the lower court to have done
so. The court, however, did indicate that it would enjoin arbitration
where: (1) fraud or duress renders the agreement voidable; (2) there
is no bona fide dispute; (3) performance is prohibited by statute; or
(4) a condition precedent has not been fulfilled or an applicable
statute satisfied. The holding, then, indicates that a New York court
will not interfere with arbitration unless the case can be brought
within the scope of one of these four situations.
Ann. tit. 5, § 161 (1930); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 47-1 (1938); Wash. Rev. Code §
7.04.010; Wis. Stat. 298.01 (1959).
Nevada has reached the same result by judicial decision. United Ass'n of
Journeymen & App. of Plumbing Local 525 v. Stine, 351 P. 2d 965 (Nev. 196o).
59 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463 (1961).
6174 N.E.2d at 464.
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Until Exercycle, the New York law in this area was in a state of
some confusion. In fact, both the concurring and dissenting judges in
Exercycle were of the opinion that a party in New York, seeking to
enjoin arbitration, has the right to have the court determine the
validity of the "main contract" 7 as well as the arbitration agreement.8
There is much authority to this effect.9 At any rate, the Exercycle de-
cision, announcing a clear cut rule, does much to alleviate this con-
fusion. Furthermore, the holding that a New York court will enforce
an arbitration provision in an agreement whether or not that agree-
ment constitutes a legal contract is a great step in arbitrational ex-
pansion. At the time of the drafting of the New York Civil Practice
Act, it was urged that the court should determine only the validity of
the arbitration agreement, and that the arbitrators should determine
the validity of the "main contract.""' Gradually New York seems to
be approaching this position.
Although under the federal act only arbitration clauses concern-
ing maritime or commercial transactions are enforced," a similar
"The term "nmain contract" is n(sed in this comment to describe the parties'
principal agreement and to distinguish this agreement from the subsidiary agree-
ment to submit to arbitration all future disputes arising out of the principal agree-
ment. See 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1436 (1951) for a discussion of this distinction.
The New York Court of Appeals has described an arbitration agreement as an
"incidental part of an indivisible contract." In re Kramer & Uchitelle, Inc., 288
N.Y. 467, 472, 43 N.E.2d 493, 496 (1942).
OThat the arbitration agreement itself must be founded on sound contact prin-
ciples and must not have been procured by fraud, duress, etc. is well settled in all
states enforcing future agreements to arbitrate. Goldberg v. Mackay, 107 N.J.L. 412
153 Atl. 639 (1931); Singleton v. Benton, 114 Ga. 548, 40 S.E. 811 (1902); Metro
Plan Inc. v. Miscone, 257 App. Div. 652, 15 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1st Dep't 1939); Smith
v. Gladney, 128 Tex. 354, 98 S.W. 351 (Comm'n App. 1936); 6 Williston, Contracts
§ 1920 (rev. ed. 1938).
"If the contract has not been made or is invalid, the court will proceed, as in
any other case, to a determination of the merits. If it has been made and is valid,
the court will stay its hand till the extrinsic fact is ascertained...." Berkovitz v.
Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 23o N.Y. 261, 13o N.E. 288, 291 (1921); Accord, Wrap-
Vertizer Corp. v. Plctnik, 3 N.Y.2d 17, 143 N.E.2d 366 (1957); In re Kramer &=
Uchitelle. Inc., 288 N.Y. 467, 43 N.E.2d 493 (19.12); Lipman v. Haeuser Shellas Co.,
289 N.Y. 76, 43 N.E.2d 817 (1942); Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas
& Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 171 N.E. 579 (1930); Seymour Grean & Co. v. Grean, 274 App.
Div. 279, 82 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1st Dep't 1948); Application of Manufacturers Chemical
Co., 259 App. Div. 321, 19 N.Y.2d 171 (1st Dep't 194o); Metro Plan Inc. v. Miscone,
257 App. Div. 652, 15 N.Y.2d 35 (ist Dep't 1939); Application of Gruen,
173 Misc. 765, 18 N.Y.S.2d 99o (Sup. Ct. 1940); 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1444 (1951);
Comment, 38 Cornell L.Q. 391 (1953)-
"0Arguments in support of this interpretation of the New York statute are
found in: Comment, 36 Yale L.J. 866 (1927); Note, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 429 (1948).
"Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956). For analyses of the various
interpretations of the terms "maritime" and "commerce" see 6 Williston, Contracts
§ 192o n.x8 (Supp. 1961); Note, 34 St. John's L. Rev. 236 (196o).
1962]
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arbitrational expansion is emerging in the federal courts. Robert
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.12 held that fraud in the in-
ducement, where the contract contained a broad arbitration provision,
was an issue for the arbitrators, as long as the arbitration agreement
itself was not fraudulently procured. 13 El Hoss Eng'r & Transp. Co.
v. American Ind. Oil Co.14 declared that any issue intended by the
parties to be within the scope of the arbitration agreement will be sent
to arbitration.'5 As yet, the New York courts have not gone this far, as
indicated by the four qualifications to the Exercycle holding. Though
the New York courts have indicated -that a defrauded party who af-
firms the contract will be compelled to arbitrate,'0 Exercycle confirms
the rule that fraud is not an arbitrable issue.
17
The practical result of this expansion of the arbitrators' jurisdic-
tion is that arbitration will be more readily available to contracting
parties. In fact, a party who signs an agreement containing a broad
arbitration clause will find himself obligated to arbitrate regardless of
the legal validity and enforceability of his contract.
Assuming the parties must arbitrate, the question is what will be
arbitrated. In order for a party to compel -arbitration there must be a
"bona fide dispute." Is But the dispute must be arbitrated with refer-
ence, at least, to some "agreement" which binds the parties. If there
is not such a legally binding agreement, from where arises the duty
to arbitrate? It could be said that the arbitration clause itself is an
independent contract'0 supported by its own consideration and giving
rise to the duty to arbitrate. Even if a duty to arbitrate is thus es-
tablished, the arbitrators would still be confronted by the same dilem-
ma. If the court does not pass upon the legal validity of the contract,
then the arbitrators themselves must first establish that some binding
agreement or contract is in existence between the parties. Other-
'-271 F.-d 402 (2d Cir. 1959) cert. granted, 362 U.S. 9o9 (196o), dismissed, 364
U.S. 8oi (1960).
271 F.2d at 41o.
14 289 F.-d 346 (2d Cir. 1961).
15289 F.2d at 3.19.
'4Amerotron Corp. v. Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Co., Inc., 3 App. Div. 2d 899,
162 N.Y.2d 214, 215 (ist Dep't 1957) aff'd mem., 4 N.Y.d 722, 148 N.E.2d 319 (1958) .
'7Wrap-Vertizer Corp. v. Plotnik, 3 N.Y.2d 17, 143 N.E.2d 366 (1957). See gen-
erally Parsell, Arbitration of Fraud in the Inducement of a Contract, 12 Cornell
L.Q. 351 (1927); Sturges, Fraudulent Inducement as a Defense to the Enforcement
of Arbitration Contracts, 36 Yale L.J. 866 (1927).
'Arbitration will not be enforced where the asserted claim is frivolous. Alpert
v. Admiration Knitwear Co., 304 N.Y. i, 1o5 N.E.-d 561, 563 (1952); S.A. Wenger &
Co. v. Propper Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., 239, N.Y. 199, 146 N.E. 203 (1924).
" See note so supra.
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wise there is no frame of reference in which to arbitrate the "bona
fide dispute."
Furthermore, it is well settled that arbitrators are not bound by
traditional rules of law.2 0 This is a rule that is succinctly stated in
Wilkins v. Allen:
21
"The award cf an arbitrator cannot be set aside for mere
errors of judgment either as to the law or as to the facts. If he
keeps within his jurisdiction, and is not guilty of fraud, cor-
ruption, or other misconduct attending his award, it is unas-
sailable, operates as a final conclusive judgment and however
disappointing it may be, the parties must abide by it."122
Herein lies the crucial problem inherent in the expansion of arbitra-
tional jurisdiction. If arbitrators are not bound by the -traditional
rules of law and their awards may not be set aside for mistakes of law,
then it appears that a party, by signing an agreement containing a
broad arbitration clause, may sign away his right to a judicial remedy
or judicial determination of the validity and enforceability of his
contract.
Section 1460 of the New York Civil Practice Act, the statute used
as a model by almost all states enforcing "future agreements" to ar-
bitrate,23 stipulates that the judge shall make an order directing ar-
bitration only after he is satisfied that there is no substantial issue as
to the making of the contract.24 Heretofore, -this section has been
interpreted to mean that no issue should exist as to the making of a
"valid contract."2 5 The Exercycle decision seems to hold, however,
that as long as no issue exists as to the making of a valid arbitra-
tion agreement, an order directing arbitration will be issued. Section
"Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392 (1875). Accord,
Wetsel v. Garibaldi, 159 Cal. App. 2d 4, 323 P.2d 524 (1958); Mayberry v. May-
berry, 121 N.C. 248, 28 S.E. 349 (1897); Johnson v. Noble, 13 N.H. 286 (1842); Patri-
otic Order Sons of America v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 305 Pa. 107, 157 AtLI. 259 (1931).
But the parties may provide in their agreement that the arbitrators must follow
rules of law. White Star Mining Co. v. Hultberg, 220 Il 578, 77 N.E. 327 (1906);
Application of Wachusett Spinning Mills, Inc., 12 Misc.2d 822, 177 N.Y.S.2d 938
(Sup. Ct. 1958).
2169 N.Y. 494, 62 N.E. 575 (1902).
-62 N.E. at 576.
2See note 4 supra.
-' 'If evidentiary facts be set forth raising a substantial issue as to the making
of the contract or submission or the failure to comply therewith, the court, or the
judge thereof, "hall proceed immediately to the trial thereof." N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§ 1450 (Clevenger 1961).
="[P]roceedings to enforce arbitration under article 84 of the Civil Practice
Act presuppose the existence of a valid and enforceable contract at the time remedy
is sought." In re Kramer & Uchitelle, Inc., 288 N.Y. 467, 43 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1942).
Accord, see cases cited in note 9 supra.
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1462 of the New York Givil Practice Act provides that fraud, cor-
ruption, partiality in the arbitration procedure, or the contention
that there was no submission or contract, will be defenses to the en-
forcement of an award.26 Since section 1462 contains essentially the
same" wording as section 1450,27 it is likely -that the Exercycle inter-
pretation will apply there also. If such be the case, then, under this
rationale, a party may indeed sign away his right to a judicial decision
as to the validity and enforceability of his main contract.
If section 1462 is interpreted to mean "no valid main contract," a
contracting party may have an award set aside by showing that no
valid main contract was, in fact, made. This interpretation would be
illogical and impractical. If the court were to set aside an award be-
cause no main contract ever came into legal existence, why should
not a stay of arbitration be granted for the same reason? Even if this
interpretation was adopted it is likely that the court would be more
reluctant to set aside an award after arbitration on the grounds that
there was no valid main contract than it would be to find the con-
tract legally unenforceable before arbitration.
On an ad hoc basis the expansion of arbitrational jurisdiction may
have just and meritorious results. In Exercycle the parties dealt at arms
length, intended 'to bind themselves, and, in fact, treated the contract
as binding for four years. It may seem inequitable to enjoin arbitra-
tion of the type of dispute the contract was intended to prevent be-
cause of a legal technicality. It is not necessarily unjust or inherently
harmful for a party to waive his right to a judicial determination of
his contract. But it is submitted that the Exercycle decision, taken as
a general rule, creates a legal situation in which a party may unwit-
tingly deprive himself of his right to a judicial remedy and find him-
self irrevocably bound to a contract which would not be enforced at
law. In the words of an earlier New York holding:
"It is a very easy thing for contracting parties to provide in a
few words for a general arbitration, if they are minded so to do.
They are not to be trapped by a strained and unnatural con-
struction of words of doubtful import into an abandonment of
legal remedies, unwilled and unforeseen."
281
It must of course be remembered that in New York a party is still en-
titled to a stay of arbitration where: (i) fraud or duress is practiced,
'"N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1462 (Clevenger 1961) states that the award of an arbi-
trator or arbitration board must be vacated "if there was no valid submission or
contract, and the objection has been raised under the conditions set forth...."
27Compare notes 24 and 26 supra.
2Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386, 393 (1929).
